To pre­sume that mar­kets and mar­ket signals can best deter­mine all allo­ca­tive deci­sions is to pre­sume that eve­ry­thing can in prin­ciple be trea­ted as a com­mo­di­ty. Commodification pre­sumes the exis­tence of pro­per­ty rights over pro­cesses, things, and social rela­tions, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be tra­ded sub­ject to legal contract. The mar­ket is pre­su­med to work as an appro­priate guide – an ethic – for all human action. In prac­tice, of course, eve­ry socie­ty sets some bounds on where com­mo­di­fi­ca­tion begins and ends. Where the boun­da­ries lie is a mat­ter of conten­tion. Certain drugs are dee­med ille­gal. The buying and sel­ling of sexual favours is out­la­wed in most US states, though elsew­here it may be lega­li­zed, decri­mi­na­li­zed, and even state-regu­la­ted as an indus­try. Pornography is broad­ly pro­tec­ted as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are cer­tain forms (main­ly concer­ning chil­dren) that are consi­de­red beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are sup­po­sed­ly not for sale, and there exists a curious pen­chant to pur­sue ‘cor­rup­tion’ as if it is easi­ly dis­tin­gui­shable from the nor­mal prac­tices of influence-pedd­ling and making money in the mar­ket­place. The com­mo­di­fi­ca­tion of sexua­li­ty, culture, his­to­ry, heri­tage ; of nature as spec­tacle or as rest cure ; the extrac­tion of mono­po­ly rents from ori­gi­na­li­ty, authen­ti­ci­ty, and uni­que­ness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount to put­ting a price on things that were never actual­ly pro­du­ced as com­mo­di­ties. There is often disa­gree­ment as to the appro­pria­te­ness of com­mo­di­fi­ca­tion (of reli­gious events and sym­bols, for example) or of who should exer­cise the pro­per­ty rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or mar­ke­ting of Aboriginal art, for example).