Si le capital domine tout au point de pouvoir s’identifier avec l’être social, il semble, sur cette base, disparaître. Tel est le fétichisme le plus aveuglant jamais produit par la valeur d’échange dans l’histoire de sa propre autonomisation. Sur cette base en effet peut surgir une catégorie « neutre » comme celle de société industrielle, et son rejeton la société de consommation. Alors peut disparaître et disparaît dans les faits toute distinction possible entre le travail abstrait qui valorise le capital (le prolétariat), ou qui rend possible la vie totale de son être (nouvelles classes moyennes), et l’activité humaine en général telle qu’elle se déroulait aux époques pré-capitalistes.
Citations
Il n’existe pas de comportement ou de ligne de conduite qui ne se définissent comme révolutionnaires en soi. Dès que cette pure stylisation de la conflictualité s’établit et qu’elle devient donc « réalisation de l’art », tout comportement, toute ligne de conduite va s’arranger pour présenter l’événement comme un de ses accidents particuliers.
Personne n’a l’exclusivité du malheur ; aucun hasard causal n’est à la racine d’une péripétie singulière. C’est au contraire, la privation, organisée sur une échelle sociale, de toute aventure concrète et subjective qui déterminé a priori les malchances de chacun. Les infortunes de la passion ne prennent pas leur source ailleurs que dans l’impossibilité universellement sanctionnée, de vivre la qualité de se passionner. Le poison qui intoxique toute volonté de s’affirmer, de s’affirmer comme qualité en être vis-à-vis de la quantité en procès – et qui la fait ressembler à un rêve démesuré, destiné par force à se renverser en un cauchemar mesuré par la quantité de vivant qui meurt – ce poison c’est la volonté impersonnelle du pouvoir qui le distille. Cette volonté impersonnelle vénéneuse est l’ennemi intime de tout vouloir-être isolé ; c’est l’universalité du non-être, qui, dans l’enceinte close du destin privé, prend l’apparence d’une particularité singulière. En isolant en chacun la qualité qui est latente en tous, la quantité fait en sorte que chacun désespère de soi.
Tout rapport humain est donc une partie jouée « pour l’argent » (en vue d’obtenir valeur symbolique) et, comme toute partie, ou bien survient concrètement dans un tripot, un cercle, une secte, une initiation, une ambiance de conjurés, une mafia, une maçonnerie, ou en évoque fortement l’image. La force de la partie est dans la règle qui la régit. Pour cette raison, sur tout jeu règne, comme étant son sens, la règle qui le régit, et pour cette raison tout rapport humain est non seulement une représentation, c’est-à-dire une transcription de symboles, non seulement il comporte un appât symbolique et une liturgie substituée aux actes réels, mais il est surtout un acte public, duquel les participants « en personne » ne sont que les spectateurs les plus proches.
Démasqué comme gestionnaire de la mort, le capital répond en se confessant ; mais immédiatement avare de tout geste et de tout être, il s’affirme comme mort repentie, il se désigne comme unique force capable de se dépasser ; initié à la dialectique, il domestique le règne de la logique, ne craignant pas de se poser comme ce paradoxe : être le défenseur d’autant plus résolu de la survie qu’il a plus puissamment produit la destruction ; être reconnu le gestionnaire le plus accrédité du sauvetage qu’il a été l’artisan le plus dénoncé du désastre.
Why was it important that the modern individual be conceptualized in terms of this internal struggle between passion/sentiments and reason ? Timothy Mitchell’s discussion of Durkheim in Colonising Egypt offers a suggestive answer. The very conception of modern individual, Mitchell says in discussing Durkheim’s texts, poses a threat to the conception of the social and the general, for if individuals are endowed with infinite individuality (which is what the drama of passions is supposed to reveal—each person his or her own novelist and analysand at the same time), what is there to guarantee the unity of the social ? What would prevent the social realm, made up of such individuals (that is, people not simply subject to social practice, as they were supposed to be in primitive societies), from collapsing into the nightmare of anomie ? The answer, at the level of the individual, would be : reason. Reason, by focusing the mind on the general and the universal, would guide the individual’s passion into its rightful place in the social realm. This thought, taken by itself, was not necessarily modern, but its generalization through society, one could argue, marks the coming of modernity.
One historicizes only insofar as one belongs to a mode of being in the world that is aligned with the principle of “disenchantment of the universe,” which underlies knowledge in the social sciences (and I distinguish knowledge from practice). But “disenchantment” is not the only principle by which we world the earth. The supernatural can inhabit the world in these other modes of worlding, and not always as a problem or result of conscious belief or ideas. The point is made in an anecdote about the poet W. B. Yeats, whose interest in fairies and other nonhuman beings of Irish folk tales is well known. I tell the story as it has been told to me by my friend David Lloyd :
One day, in the period of his extensive researches on Irish folklore in rural Connemara, William Butler Yeats discovered a treasure. The treasure was a certain Mrs. Connolly who had the most magnificent repertoire of fairy stories that W.B. had ever come across. He sat with her in her little cottage from morning to dusk, listening and recording her stories, her proverbs and her lore. As twilight drew on, he had to leave and he stood up, still dazed by all that he had heard. Mrs. Connolly stood at the door as he left, and just as he reached the gate he turned back to her and said quietly, “One more question Mrs. Connolly, if I may. Do you believe in the fairies?” Mrs. Connolly threw her head back and laughed. “Oh, not at all Mr. Yeats, not at all.” W.B. paused, turned away and slouched off down the lane. Then he heard Mrs. Connolly’s voice coming after him down the lane : “But they’re there, Mr. Yeats, they’re there.”
As old Mrs Connolly knew, and as we social scientists often forget, gods and spirits are not dependent on human beliefs for their own existence ; what brings them to presence are our practices.
Subaltern histories written with an eye to difference cannot constitute yet another attempt, in the long and universalistic tradition of “socialist” histories, to help erect the subaltern as the subject of modern democracies, that is, to expand the history of the modern in such a way as to make it more representative of society as a whole. This is a laudable objective on its own terms and has undoubted global relevance. But thought does not have to stop at political democracy or the concept of egalitarian distribution of wealth (though the aim of achieving these ends will legitimately fuel many immediate political struggles). Subaltern histories will engage philosophically with questions of difference that are elided in the dominant traditions of Marxism. At the same time, however, just as real labor cannot be thought of outside of the problematic of abstract labor, subaltern history cannot be thought of outside of the global narrative of capital—including the narrative of transition to capitalism—though it is not grounded in this narrative. Stories about how this or that group in Asia, Africa, or Latin America resisted the “penetration” of capitalism do not, in this sense, constitute “subaltern” history, for these narratives are predicated on imagining a space that is external to capital—the chronologically “before” of capital—but that is at the same time a part of the historicist, unitary time frame within which both the “before” and the “after” of capitalist production can unfold. The “outside” I am thinking of is different from what is simply imagined as “before or after capital” in historicist prose. This “outside” I think of, following Derrida, as something attached to the category “capital” itself, something that straddles a border zone of temporality, that conforms to the temporal code within which capital comes into being even as it violates that code, something we are able to see only because we can think/theorize capital, but that also always reminds us that other temporalities, other forms of worlding, coexist and are possible. In this sense, subaltern histories do not refer to a resistance prior and exterior to the narrative space created by capital ; they cannot therefore be defined without reference to the category “capital.” Subaltern studies, as I think of it, can only situate itself theoretically at the juncture where we give up neither Marx nor “difference,” for, as I have said, the resistance it speaks of is something that can happen only within the time horizon of capital, and yet it has to be thought of as something that disrupts the unity of that time. Unconcealing the tension between real and abstract labor ensures that capital/commodity has heterogeneities and incommensurabilities inscribed in its core.
The prefix pre in “precapital,” it could be said similarly, is not a reference to what is simply chronologically prior on an ordinal, homogeneous scale of time. “Precapitalist” speaks of a particular relationship to capital marked by the tension of difference in the horizons of time. The “precapitalist,” on the basis of this argument, can only be imagined as something that exists within the temporal horizon of capital and that at the same time disrupts the continuity of this time by suggesting another time that is not on the same, secular, homogeneous calendar (which is why what is precapital is not chronologically prior to capital, that is to say, one cannot assign it to a point on the same continuous time line). This is another time that, theoretically, could be entirely immeasurable in terms of the units of the godless, spiritless time of what we call “history,” an idea already assumed in the secular concepts of “capital” and “abstract labor.”
Let me make it clear that the raging Medusa of cultural relativism is not rearing her ugly head in my discussion at this point. To allow for plurality, signified by the plurality of gods, is to think in terms of singularities. To think in terms of singularities, however—and this I must make clear since so many scholars these days are prone to see parochialism, essentialism, or cultural relativism in every claim of non-Western difference—is not to make a claim against the demonstrable and documentable permeability of cultures and languages. It is, in fact, to appeal to models of cross-cultural and cross-categorical translations that do not take a universal middle term for granted. The Hindi pani may be translated into the English “water” without having to go through the superior positivity of H2O. In this, at least in India but perhaps elsewhere as well, we have something to learn from nonmodern instances of cross-categorial translation.
I give an example here of the translation of Hindu gods into expressions of Islamic divinity that was performed in an eighteenth-century Bengali religious text called Shunya-puran. (The evidence belongs to the “history of conversion” to Islam in Bengal.) This text has a description, well known to students of Bengali literature, of Islamic wrath falling upon a group of oppressive Brahmins. As part of this description, it gives the following account of an exchange of identities between individual Hindu deities and their Islamic counterparts. What is of interest here is the way this translation of divinities works :
Dharma who resided in Baikuntha was grieved to see all this [Brahminic misconduct]. He came to the world as a Muhammadan … [and] was called Khoda… . Brahma incarnated himself as Muhammad, Visnu as Paigambar and Civa became Adamfa (Adam). Ganesa came as a Gazi, Kartika as a Kazi, Narada became a Sekha and Indra a Moulana. The Risis of heaven became Fakirs… . The goddess Chandi incarnated herself as Haya Bibi [the wife of the original man] and Padmavati became Bibi Nur [Nur = light].
Eaton’s recent study of Islam in Bengal gives many more such instances of translation of gods. Consider the case of an Arabic-Sankrit bilingual inscription from a thirteenth-century mosque in coastal Gujarat that Eaton cites in his discussion. The Arabic part of this inscription, dated 1264, “refers to the deity worshiped in the mosque as Allah” while, as Eaton puts it, “the Sanskrit text of the same inscription addresses the supreme god by the names Visvanatha (‘lord of the universe’), Sunyarupa (‘one whose form is of the void’), and Visvarupa (‘having various forms’).” Further on, Eaton gives another example : “The sixteenth-century poet Haji Muhammad identified the Arabic Allah with Gosai (Skt. ‘Master’), Saiyid Murtaza identified the Prophet’s daughter Fatima with Jagat-janani (Skt ‘Mother of the World’), and Saiyid Sultan identified the God of Adam, Abraham, and Moses with Prabhu (Skt. ‘Lord’).”
In a similar vein, Carl W. Ernst’s study of South Asian Sufism mentions a coin issued by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (c. 1018 C.E.) that contained “a Sanskrit translation of the Islamic profession of faith.” One side of the coin had an Arabic inscription whereas the other side said, in Sanskrit : avyaktam ekam muhamadah avatarah nrpati mahamuda (which Ernst translates as, “There is One unlimited [unmanifest?], Muhammad is the avatar, the king is Mahmud”). Ernst comments, expressing a sensibility that is no doubt modern : “The selection of the term avatar to translate the Arabic rasul, ‘messenger,’ is striking, since avatar is a term reserved in Indian thought for the descent of the god Vishnu into earthly form… . It is hard to do more than wonder at the theological originality of equating the Prophet with the avatar of Vishnu.”
The interesting point, for our purpose and in our language, is how the translations in these passages take for their model of exchange barter rather than the generalized exchange of commodities, which always needs the mediation of a universal, homogenizing middle term (such as, in Marxism, abstract labor). The translations here are based on very local, particular, one-for-one exchanges, guided in part, no doubt—at least in the case of Shunya-puran—by the poetic requirements of alliterations, meter, rhetorical conventions, and so on. There are surely rules in these exchanges, but the point is that even if I cannot decipher them all—and even if they are not all decipherable, that is to say, even if the processes of translation contain a degree of opacity—it can be safely asserted that these rules cannot and would not claim to have the “universal” character of the rules that sustain conversations between social scientists working on disparate sites of the world. As Gautam Bhadra has written : “One of the major features of these types of cultural interaction [between Hindus and Muslims] is to be seen at the linguistic level. Here, recourse is often had to the consonance of sounds or images to transform one god into another, a procedure that appeals more … to popular responses to alliteration, rhyming and other rhetorical devices—rather than to any elaborate structure of reason and argument.”
One critical aspect of this mode of translation is that it makes no appeal to any of the implicit universals that inhere in the sociological imagination. When it is claimed, for instance, by persons belonging to devotional traditions (bhakti) that “the Hindu’s Ram is the same as the Muslim’s Rahim,” the contention is not that some third category expresses the attributes of Ram or Rahim better than either of these two terms and thus mediates in the relationship between the two. Yet such claim is precisely what would mark an act of translation modeled on Newtonian science. The claim there would be that not only do H2O, water, and pani refer to the same entity or substance but that H2O best expresses or captures the attributes, the constitutional properties, of this substance. “God” became such an item of universal equivalence in the nineteenth century, but this is not characteristic of the kind of cross-categorial translations we are dealing with here.
Consider the additional example Ernst provides of such nonmodern translation of gods. He mentions “a fifteenth century Sanskrit text written in Gujarati for guidance of Indian architects employed to build mosques. In it, the god Visvakarma says of the mosque, ‘There is no image and there they worship, through dhyana, … the formless, attributeless, all-pervading Supreme God whom they call Rahamana.’” The expression “supreme God” does not function in the manner of a scientific third term, for it has no higher claims of descriptive ability, it does not stand for a truer reality. For, after all, if the supreme One was without attributes, how could one human language claim to have captured the attributes of this divinity better than a word in another language that is also human ? These instances of translation do not necessarily suggest peace and harmony between Hindus and Muslims, but they are translations in which codes are switched locally, without going through a universal set of rules. There are no overarching censoring/limiting/defining systems of thought that neutralize and relegate differences to the margins, nothing like an overarching category of “religion” that is supposed to remain unaffected by differences between the entities it seeks to name and thereby contain. The very obscurity of the translation process allows the incorporation of that which remains untranslatable.